"The human condition" is a phrase much heard in recent years. It is significant that it was Montaigne from whom it was borrowed, for his age, like our own, was characterized by rapid and fundamental changes in every sphere of life. It is in such periods, when the traditional, customary framework of principles, implicit and explicit, is no longer able to provide an unquestioned orientation for thought and action, rather than in times of comparative social stability, that questions embraced by the above phrase—the nature of man, his place in the total order of existence, the basic pattern of his changes, and so on—are widely and intensively discussed.

A specific feature of the more recent discussions—say, over about the last fifteen years—has been the increasing prominence of attempts to expound and evaluate Marx's contributions to the question or, at least, the consequences of his ideas in this connection. And this has been done largely by non-Marxists. The history of Marx's reception into the academic world has yet to be written. When it is, it will be a record of the very greatest importance for understanding the intellectual history of approximately the last hundred years. From first being considered purely an economist, he is now in danger of being considered purely a philosopher, and in the first place a philosopher of man and society.

Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition is an example of this interconnection of themes. She sets out to re-examine the theme forming the title of her book "from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears" (p. 5). Certain ideas of Marx—central ones, according to Miss Arendt—form a central thread of reference and discussion throughout the book. In sum, Miss Arendt finds many of Marx's analyses to be profound and fruitful. Nevertheless, though she explicitly dissociates herself from the professional, professorial trade of Marx-refuting—which is frequently combined, she notes, with plagiarism from his works (p. 79)—she finds a "fundamental and flagrant" contradiction running "like a red thread through the whole of Marx's thought" (p. 104), and this leads to "patent absurdities" (p. 102).

Miss Arendt has already received no little acclaim for her history of totalitarianism. Her book on "the human condition" is of imposing scope. Enthusiastic reviews in a number of serious and influential journals have praised its concentrated and abstruse thought and its apparatus of erudition. It has already been republished in a leading paperback series. The sum of all this seems to be that the book is reasonably assured of a fairly wide circulation and that its contents will be treated with no little respect.

Obviously many aspects of the book demand critical discussion. Perhaps the first is her general method. Another is her interpretation of the general philosophical implications of modern science, especially physics. The following discussion will, however, be confined to her treatment of Marx. The aim of this discussion will be, first, to show that her interpretation of Marx is completely erroneous and that there is no foundation whatsoever for the "contradiction" in Marx's thought which she presents. Second, some attempt will be made (largely in the course of pursuing the first aim) to explain some points in Marx's thought relevant to the discussion of "the human condition," particularly in its contemporary form, partly with a view to suggesting that these provide a far more satisfactory descriptive and explanatory apparatus than that of Miss Arendt.
In doing this one runs the risk of carrying through just one more exercise in quotation. Nevertheless, this danger must be faced, for if we are to make the best use of Marx's insights, if we are going to attempt to go beyond Marx, then he must first be understood. Marx must be surpassed, not by-passed. To use the purposely double-edged Hegelian term of which he was so fond, his ideas must be aufgehoben.

I

Before explaining Miss Arendt's criticism of Marx in detail, a few points of her own views must be noted.

According to Miss Arendt, the "most elementary articulations of the human condition" are "labor," "work," and "action." Only the first two are relevant for the following discussion. The objective conditions for these are, respectively, life (the body from the biological-physiological point of view) and "worldliness" (the environment of humanly constructed artifacts). The processes involved are pure repetition (constant metabolism between the body as a physical entity and the natural world of which it is a part) and multiplication (also "reification"). "Work" is distinguished from "labor" by, first, the relative durability of its products (comparatively permanent "use objects" as against absolutely impermanent "consumer goods"), and second, the fact that it is "performed under the guidance of a model in accordance with which the object is constructed ... an image beheld by the eye of the mind or a blueprint" (p. 140).

Miss Arendt characterizes modern times as the age of "society," a term which has a very special meaning in her book. For the purposes of the present discussion it is not necessary to explain this idea in detail, however. It is sufficient to note that the development of "society" has now culminated in the rise of "labor" as the dominating mode of the "human condition." Animal laborans is ruled by "the principle of happiness" (pp. 308 ff.), and happiness, the sumnum bonum, is "life" in the purely biological sense of having and enjoying an abundance of consumer goods (pp. 313 ff.), so that the single task and goal of the overwhelming majority of people (in general, everyone except artists) is the production, acquisition, and consumption of consumer goods (pp. 125–28, 209).

It follows that the laboring society is a waste economy: its entire activity is laboring, and this is a continuous metabolism between man and nature which depends on immediate consumption of what is produced through labor; otherwise the whole system breaks down (pp. 126, 134).

But real happiness requires a balance between exertion and rest, tension and relaxation, and modern industrial technique and social organization have so simplified and facilitated the majority of tasks that they can no longer properly be called "labor" at all; the people who perform them are better called "jobholders" than "laborers." This stage demands of its members a sheer automatic functioning, as though individual life had actually been submerged in the over-all life of the species and the only active decision still required of the individual were to let go, so to speak, to abandon his individuality, the still individually sensed pain and trouble of living, and acquiesce in a dazed, "tranquilized," functional type of behavior [p. 322].

Life becomes futile, meaningless. Consuming man is a greedy creature who can use leisure only to consume more. The danger is that with the advent of automation, which makes the almost complete elimination of all laboring a clear possibility, he will be deprived of the one activity, besides consuming, of which he is capable (pp. 5, 133–34, 135, 321–22).

Let us see where Miss Arendt locates the fundamental contradiction in Marx's thought. It is to be found in "Marx's attitude toward labor, and that is toward the very center of his thought" (p. 104). On the one hand, Miss Arendt says, Marx defines man as a laboring animal (in her sense
of "labor"); on the other hand, he sees the task and goal of social revolution, of socialism and communism, as that of freeing men from labor (pp. 104, 130). But: "Emancipation from labor, in Marx's own terms ... would ultimately mean emancipation from consumption as well, that is, from the metabolism with nature which is the very condition of human life" (p. 131).

From this point of view Marx, far from being the prophet of the future, is, rather, simply the most consistent and comprehensive theorist of the contemporary laboring society, his ideal society—"socialized mankind"—being just a "mass society of laborers" (p. 118). For Marx what was left was ... the force of the life process itself, to which all men and all human activities were equally submitted ... and whose only aim, if it had an aim at all, was survival of the animal species man. None of the higher capacities of man was any longer necessary to connect individual life with the life of the species; individual life became part of the life process, and to labor, to assure the continuity of one's own life and the life of his family, was all that was needed" [p. 321; cf. 60, 72, 89].

Like Bergson and Nietzsche, he is a glorifier of "life" as the dynamic creator of all values; he identifies Life and Being (pp. 117, 172, 313).

II

Let us now compare Miss Arendt's account of Marx with Marx's own words.

There can be no doubt that Marx regarded labor (Arbeit) and, specifically, labor by means of tools, as the feature differentiating man from the rest of the animal kingdom. The question is, then, whether Marx meant by this "labor" in Miss Arendt's sense and whether he confused it with what she calls "work."

Marx's central discussion of the "labor process" occurs in the first volume of Capital.5 He emphasizes here that he is not concerned with "the first animal-like and instinctive forms of labor," but with labor in the form which "is peculiar to man." He finds this peculiarity of human labor in the fact that the latter results in something "which, at the beginning of the process, already existed in the worker's imagination, already existed as an idea." The human laborer "not only ... effects (bewirkt) a change of form in natural objects," as animals and insects do, but at the same time "realizes (verwirklicht) his own purpose" in nature.6 But this is precisely the second of Miss Arendt's criteria of "work," as listed previously.

The other criterion is that of durability. But this feature, relating to the product and not to the process resulting in the product, is simply a function of time and use, purely quantitative, qualitatively homogeneous factors which cannot provide a criterion of essential demarcation, being quite accidental features of the object. The distinction between "consumer goods" and "use objects," from the point of view of durability, is a highly relative and contingent one.

It thus seems that, from this point of view at least, Miss Arendt's "work" coincides with Marx's "labor."

Miss Arendt grants, indeed, that Marx had "occasional hesitations" about his concept of labor (p. 99, n. 36), that there exists in his work, besides the dominant concept of labor (in her sense), also that of work (in her sense). But that Marx was really not concerned with work, and only with labor, is shown by the fact that "the apparently all-important element of 'imagination' plays no role whatsoever in his labor theory," and that in the third volume of Capital he repeats that surplus labor beyond immediate needs serves "the progressive extension of the reproduction process."

It has just been seen that Miss Arendt's first point is simply false: in Marx's central discussion of his theory of labor it is precisely the "element of 'imagination' " that plays the basic role. That he does not constantly reiterate this point each time the idea of "labor" comes up is easily under-
standable if it is remembered that Marx was basically concerned not with the labor process in general—with those features of it common to all modes of production—but rather with the specific features of different historically given (and historically possible) forms of the labor process and, in particular, of course, with that at the basis of the economic system of capitalism. This is also the context of the passages in the third volume of Capital referred to by Miss Arendt. Even on page 872 (German ed., 1949), Marx does not say that all surplus labor beyond immediate needs serves the "progressive extension of the reproduction process." He says: "A definite quantity of surplus labor is required for security against contingencies, for the necessary progressive extension of the reproduction process corresponding to the development of needs and the increase in population, an extension that, from the point of view of capitalism, appears as accumulation." On page 278 of the same volume he explains that, under the conditions of capitalist production, "capital and its self-expansion (Selbstverwertung) appears as the point of departure and the conclusion, as the motive and goal of production . . . production is production purely for the sake of capital and the means of production are not, on the contrary, simply the means for a constantly expanding reconstitution (Gestaltung) of the life-process for the society of producers." Miss Arendt says further, putting, as it were, the finishing touch to her argument, that "Marx remained convinced that 'Milton produced Paradise Lost for the same reason a silk worm produces silk.'" But Marx's meaning is again misunderstood. Marx was here comparing Milton and the silkworm not with respect to the nature of their respective labor processes (in particular, he was certainly not saying that the labor expended in the production of Milton's poem was a purely physiological process like the production of silk by the worm) but with respect to the fact that, in each case, what was produced was an immediate, spontane-
the individual to the division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished," after labor has ceased to be "only a means of life." Let us look at this in somewhat more detail.

According to Marx, labor in the sense defined in, for example, Capital, is certainly the basic means of self-preservation and the continuance of the species. But it is much more than that—animals, for example, continue to live and reproduce without labor in the specifically human sense. "The way in which men produce their means of subsistence . . . must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is . . . a definite mode of life on their part." Labor is man's chief means to knowledge and development. Marx here drew heavily (with fundamental theoretical transformations) on Hegel's treatment of labor, especially in the Phänomenologie des Geistes. Hegel conceived man as "the result of his own labor." In trying to mold the objective world into forms which he holds in his imagination (motivated in the first place by the needs of existence), man discovers the laws, independent of him, governing that world. At the same time, in trying to accomplish this transformation of the world he must call up (and hence often discover) his own powers and, furthermore, develop them. Man creates new types of objects, ones not already present in nature, and these condition the development of corresponding modes of apprehension (e.g., the development of the human musical sense).

If, then, man discovers and develops the natural world, and himself as a part of this world—yet distinct from it, insofar as he possesses the unique power of consciously transforming it—he can only discover and develop in a complex but integrated manner if his labor is carried on in a similarly complex but integrated way. But, Marx argues, the division of labor which has formed the basis of man's various modes of production throughout most of human history (at least "civilized" history) has stood in the way of this. Until the end of the Middle Ages the division of labor had been mostly, on the one hand, into the basic divisions of production (agriculture, industry, etc.) and, on the other, into various sub-branches of this general division of labor (e.g., the various crafts). Marx considered that even this degree of division of labor leads to "some crippling of mind and body," insofar as the human mind and body becomes limited to only one type of activity.

But at least at this period men owned their own materials and instruments of labor, they made complete products according to their own designs and methods, and they disposed of them directly; furthermore, they produced as real members of communities. The advent of capitalism changed all this. Capitalism presupposes that the majority have no significant degree of ownership of the means of production and no communal ties that might prevent them from appearing as "free" labor power on the market. The first stage of the system of capitalist production (until, roughly, the Industrial Revolution) introduced the peculiarly capitalist division of labor which consists in the grouping of a number of workers in one establishment, each worker performing only one partial operation, the product being complete only after having passed successively through the hands of all. The Industrial Revolution introduced some important changes here, but in general they were only intensifications of what was already present at this stage.

In his earliest comprehensive study of the quality of life under capitalism (the manuscripts of 1844), Marx saw man as suffering from "estrangement" (Entfremdung). He is estranged, in the first place, from the product, the result of his labor, by the fact that it is privately appropriated and disposed of by his employer without reference to him. Second, he is estranged from the standpoint of his productive act, insofar as the labor he performs is purely external and alien to his individual person-
ality, constituting no satisfaction of his inner needs, no development of his specific capacities, as it is imposed on him from without, with no reference to his uniqueness. Finally, he is estranged from his fellows. Man is essentially a social animal (a *Gattungswesen* as Marx puts it); his "essence" is the total content and structure of his social relations. But under the above social conditions he is related to other members of the human species only insofar as the satisfaction of needs is concerned: insofar as they can satisfy his needs and he can satisfy theirs. The relations between people become external, purely utilitarian only. The concreteness of the real individual is depleted until he becomes just a source of labor power (abstract worker) or source of employment (abstract capitalist). The life of the species is productive life ("productive" in the specifically human sense). But here the productive life appears only as a means to life, not the essence and end of life itself. Men become estranged from the nature of their own species and hence from themselves.

Nor is this condition restricted to members of the working class. A division of labor occurs within the ruling class also, producing specific types of personal one-sidedness. The consideration of people as merely means to an end (production of wealth), instead of ends in themselves, results here too in an estrangement from the species. Furthermore, the categories of their own life-activity are subject to a specific type of estrangement.

This, then, is the sort of labor and its consequences from which man is to be emancipated, according to Marx. Man must be liberated from labor that is determined only by external necessity, labor that is non-specific to individual men, which is devoted to the production of what is common to the needs of human beings as such, that is, the material presuppositions of their lives, "laboring that is determined by want and external utility" (*Not und äussere Zweckmässigkeit*). Thus the domain of free, properly human labor "lies beyond the sphere of strictly material production." In this domain only internal necessity has a place, the necessity constituted by the specific needs of development of specific individuals. In this realm of freedom, the process of development of human powers "is valued for its own sake" (*als Selbstzweck gilt*), labor becoming, to cite once more the words from which we took our point of departure, "life's prime want," the difference between "labor" time and "free" time disappearing.

Man does not lose himself in his object, only when the latter becomes for him a *human* object or objective man. This is only possible insofar as it becomes for him a social object, and he himself becomes, for himself, a social being, just as society becomes a being for him in this object. Thus, insofar as for man in society the objective world everywhere becomes a world of essential human powers (*menschlichen Wesenskräfte*), human reality, and thus the reality of his own specific essential powers, do all objects become for him the objectification of himself, objects which manifest and realize his individuality, *his* objects; that is, he himself becomes the object. How they become *his* depends on the nature of the object and on the nature of the essential power which corresponds to it; for it is precisely the specific nature of this relation that forms the particular, *real* manner of affirmation.

The above analyses and explanations have attempted to show that the particular contradiction which Miss Arendt finds in Marx's thought is a result only of a fundamentally erroneous interpretation on her part. At the same time it should be clear that it is also quite false to see Marx as the theoretical prophet of the "laboring society" in Miss Arendt's sense. On the contrary, Marx was one of the most passionate critics of the state of society, some features of which Miss Arendt describes. But he was not just this; he was also one of its profoundest analysts, perhaps the deepest of all. He not only described the social phenomena in question but also attempted to explain their origins and thus to provide a
key to their change. And the two tasks are not finally separable: a description which strives toward completeness eventually runs into problems of explanation. It is in this respect that Miss Arendt's exposition is so unsatisfactory, even in its positive parts.

Take, for example, the question of "consumerism" that constitutes one of her main characterizations of the "laboring society." This she puts forward purely as a matter of fact. The depth and extent of penetration of this "ideology," as Miss Arendt sees the matter, may be disputed. Nevertheless the phenomenon is there; moreover, it was carefully noted by Marx well over a century ago. Furthermore, he attempted an explanation of it. Within the economic system of capitalism, Marx says, the aim of man is production and the aim of production is wealth. Production is carried on, not for the sake of people but, in the final analysis, for the sake of production itself. He contrasts this with, for example, the state of affairs in ancient Greece (and presumably Rome—he refers to "the ancients") where "wealth never appears as the aim of production. . . . The inquiry always concerns the sort of property that creates the best citizen."24 The continued existence of the capitalist mode of production thus presupposes the unbroken continuity of the production-consumption-production cycle, since the main interest of the capitalist is not in use values, but in the exchange values embodied in objects having use values, and exchange can only be continued by continuous consumption of use values.25 Thus it must be an essential aim of capitalism to stimulate consumption—by the intensified satisfaction of old needs, and the creation of new—through all possible avenues.26 This is of course not a complete explanation, but it forms the foundation for one. It must be completed, for example, by an account of how the depleted quality of life, as a result of the "estrangement" suffered by all classes of society (as a consequence of the mode of production specific to that society) creates an atmosphere in which such stimulation of consumption finds a maximum possibility of success, in which satisfaction through simple, passive consumption is preferred to the more complex, more active, and strenuous forms of satisfaction. In such a situation, Marx says that possessing is an even greater object of desire than using; a mode of being is replaced as a goal by the mode of having.27

Again, Miss Arendt sees another fundamental feature of "society" (in her sense of this term), and particularly of contemporary society, as a process of leveling down, a tendency to conformity (pp. 39–46). This is in fact, of course, another widely discussed idea, as little original to Miss Arendt's book as is the idea of "consumerism," and represents a phenomenon of real importance. Marx does not seem to have discussed the matter anywhere in his works. However, the main lines of what his approach would have been are fairly clear from the basic lines of his thought already presented. If a person achieves self-knowledge and self-development through his work, his main life-activity, then the work will be less self-revealing and self-developing, less differentiating, the less that work—the product and the mode of producing it—is determined by the specific individuality of the person; or, looked at from another side, the less differentiated the work the less differentiation it will stamp on the people performing it. But the whole tendency of the evolution of modern production has been to erase all distinctions (of strength, skill, sex, etc.) in the labor power of those serving the machines, to "level" qualitative differences into a single uniform type of expenditure of energy. And this has become increasingly true not only of factory work but of office work also. Furthermore, uniformity will tend to be stamped on leisure activities also—for example, entertainment. This is partly owing to the restrictedness of variety of types of entertainment even in an "affluent society." It is also a result of the fact that the uniformity of sentimental banality, of the monotonous indistinguish-
ability of the simple, crude world of the instincts, of all types of standardized escapism, is easier, therefore cheaper, and therefore more profitable to produce than work of quality; and by definition production—of entertainment also—is carried on not for the sake of people but for the sake of wealth. "Just as industry speculates on the refinement of needs, so it does also on their crudeness, on their artificially produced crudeness, the true spirit of which is thus self-stupefaction, this merely apparent satisfaction of need." Furthermore, such types of entertainment are also of value in creating and maintaining an atmosphere appropriate to the continuance of the prevailing order: obscuring real images of men as they are and of their potentialities, accustoming people to the acceptance of the conditions in which they find themselves.

A more comprehensive discussion of the contemporary idea of "leveling," "conformity," "other-directedness," "organization man," etc., from the standpoint of Marx's ideas, applying his general analysis to phenomena either not present or only implicitly so during his lifetime, would necessitate the taking into account of the specific features of the development of capitalism during the present century, putting first the fundamental tendency toward the ever greater concentration of economic power, with the corresponding narrowing of opportunities for individual initiative, increasing bureaucratization of society, and the adaptation of the individual to this state of affairs. But this would go well beyond the framework of this essentially expository paper.

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

NOTES

1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. Unless otherwise designated, all page references in text are to this work.

2. There are at least two pervasive features of Miss Arendt's general methods of inquiry and explanation. The first is a tendency to explain what are really specifically social phenomena in biological terms, as, e.g., when she writes that "earning and spending power . . . are only modifications of the two-fold metabolism of the human body" (p. 124). (This is by no means an uncommon method, one which C. Wright Mills has called "biological reductionism.") The other, and more frequent, method is the opposite of this, i.e., in terms of pure ideas only (see the explicit justification for this on p. 259). The result is that certain features of historical-intellectual development which simply cannot be explained in terms of the imminent connection of ideas (or by biological factors) become quite incomprehensible, and a semi-irrationalist element enters (see esp. p. 251).

3. The present writer found much of Miss Arendt's lengthy treatment of this topic barely intelligible and, when understandable, hardly worthy of serious criticism (see, to cite just one example, the passage on pp. 285–86). Limitations of space forbid my amplifying this statement.

4. For the above distinctions see pp. 7–9, 87, 88, 94–96, 98, 141–42, 143–44, 168, and 172.

5. Das Kapital, Vol. I (Berlin, 1947), chap. v, sec. 1. Translations, unless otherwise noted, are by the present writer. All emphases occur in the original, unless otherwise noted.

6. Ibid., pp. 185–86.

7. The reference is to Theories of Surplus Value (London, 1951), p. 186; cf. The Human Condition, p. 321, where this passage from Marx is referred to, implicitly, again.


9. My emphasis. The passage appears in Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Part 1, III, 88 (hereinafter referred to as "MEGA").


11. My emphasis. See also the similar account in Engels' early (1847) Grundsätze des Kommunismus (Berlin, 1955), pp. 29–32.


13. MEGA, Part 1, III, 156.

14. Cf. on this last point ibid., 120.

15. Das Kapital, I, 381.


17. Ibid., pp. 85–86, and also Selected Works, I, 77–78.


20. *Das Kapital*, III (Berlin ed., 1949), chap. xlviii, pp. 873-74. On p. 87 (n. 17) of her book Miss Arendt quotes (in German) part of the first sentence of this passage, viz., “The realm of freedom begins in fact only where laboring ceases.” Comparison with the complete sentence in Marx’s text shows that the part omitted (“that is determined by want and external utility”) is precisely the clause needed to define what Marx meant by “laboring” in this context; to quote Marx thus amounts to a complete distortion of his meaning. But, surprisingly enough, the full sentence is quoted by Miss Arendt further on (p. 104), without the significance of this for her earlier argument appearing to occur to her.


22. *MEGA*, Part 1, III, 119. Cf. also *The German Ideology*, pp. 65, 21–22, and the passage from Marx’s notebooks of 1844–45 quoted by Miss Arendt on p. 254, n. 4. It must at least be said that practically everything essential for the overturning of the main line of her interpretation of Marx is cited by Miss Arendt herself.

23. A final point: it is completely erroneous to link Marx with Nietzsche and Bergson as a philosopher of “Life,” as Miss Arendt does. On this point see G. Lukács, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* (Berlin, 1953), pp. 22, 244 ff., 318 ff.

24. *Grundrisse* . . . , p. 387, and *Capital*, I, 386–88. But despite his immense admiration for the achievements of the Greeks (see the immediately succeeding passage and pp. 30–31 in *Grundrisse* . . . ), he was never (as Miss Arendt seems to be at times) an uncritical Philhellenist, making clear that he considered the perfection attained by the Greeks a limited and one-sided one (see, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 388, 415). On capitalism as producing for the sake of production see the passage from *Das Kapital*, III, 278, quoted earlier.

25. See on this point *Das Kapital*, II, 122.

26. Within the framework of private property, Marx wrote in 1844, “everybody speculates on creating a new need in another, in order to force him to make a new sacrifice, to put him into a new mode of dependence, and to seduce him into a new mode of pleasure. . . . Each person seeks to create an alien essential power (*Wesenskraft*) over the other in order to find therein the satisfaction of his own selfish need. With the mass of objects there thus increases the realm of alien beings to which man is subject, and each new product raises reciprocal deception and reciprocal plundering to a new power. Man becomes all the poorer as a man . . . and . . . his neediness increases precisely as the power of money increases” (*MEGA*, Part 1, III, 127–28). Books like Vance Packard’s *The Hidden Persuaders* and *The Waste Makers* are simply descriptive commentaries on this.


29. Erich Fromm has discussed some of these, and other points, in *The Sane Society* (New York, 1955).